Main Article Content

Authors

Josef Myslín *

Abstract

The end of large-scale hostilities in Ukraine would represent an unequivocally positive development, yet peace itself will not eliminate the consequences of war. Rather, it may expose a set of accumulated demographic, social, economic and institutional pressures that are partly obscured by wartime mobilisation, emergency governance and sustained international assistance. This article develops the concept of the peace exposure effect to describe the process through which war-generated liabilities become more administratively, fiscally and politically salient when military priorities cease to dominate public policy. Drawing on recent evidence from the World Bank, the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, UNHCR, IOM, the OECD, the IMF and the European Union, as well as peer-reviewed research on post-war reconstruction and forced migration, the study analyses Ukraine's prospective labour-force shortages, demographic decline, war-related disability, veteran reintegration, family vulnerability, displacement, refugee return, infrastructure destruction, fiscal constraints and territorial uncertainty. A comparative historical analysis examines Western Europe after the Second World War, post-war West Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the return of refugees to the former Yugoslavia. The article argues that international finance will be necessary but insufficient. Successful recovery will require a coordinated framework linking credible security, human-capital restoration, veteran and disability policy, refugee and diaspora engagement, institutional reform, productive infrastructure, private investment and European integration. The central challenge after the war will not merely be rebuilding what has been destroyed, but creating economic and social conditions under which Ukrainians choose to build their future in the country.

Keywords:
Ukraine, post-war reconstruction, peace exposure effect, demographic decline, human capital, refugees, veterans, European integration

Article Details

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